The Many Faces of UNTAC: A Review Article

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The Bayon temple at the Angkor complex is a marvel of architectural perfection. Two hundred and eight identical faces of the Buddha, of various shapes and sizes protruding in all directions, adorn its fifty-four summits and towers. The faces themselves reveal a distant, impenetrable smile which archaeologists, art historians, and students of religion have struggled to understand for years.

The Bayon is, perhaps, an apt image with which to begin assessing the mission of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Should UNTAC be judged in comparison with other U.N. missions by how well the United Nations fulfilled its mandate, or by the appropriateness of the mandate itself, or by its social and economic impact
on Cambodia, or by the actions of the foreign powers who organized and ran it or by the outcome which the treaty, the mission, and the electoral process produced? Figuring out the relevant criteria to evaluate the mission is in many ways like trying to determine which is the truest face of the Bayon.

Helping us wade through this difficult issue are a number of recently published books on the U.N. role in Cambodia. Arguably the best and certainly the most thorough of the books is Trevor Findlay's Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC. Findlay has amassed a wealth of information on the U.N. mission, particularly from U.N. documents and recollections of former UNTAC officials. He presents his opinions on the successes and failures of the UNTAC mission clearly and supports them with convincing evidence. Jarat Chopra's United Nations Authority in Cambodia, which by design goes less in depth than Findlay's book, offers a thoughtful examination of the mission, particularly on the policy level. Between Hope and Insecurity: The Social Consequences of the Cambodian Peace Process, produced by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) and edited by Peter Utting, attempts to show a more human face of the UNTAC mission and the peace process, although with considerably less consistency and success. Finally, the United Nations Blue Book, entitled The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991–1995, provides a series of interesting documents relating to the international diplomacy surrounding the peace process and the UNTAC mission.

Certainly, the easiest way to evaluate the U.N. mission is by comparing it to U.N. attempts elsewhere. As Chopra notes, the UNTAC mission was formulated within the context of a perceived post-Cold War "renaissance" of the United Nations, when great power co-operation appeared to allow regional conflicts to wind down. George Bush's "new world order" seemed to many to be approaching in the distance. The Paris Treaty establishing the UNTAC mission was a clear example of this new international co-operation and its promise for the future. Because the Cambodia mission was one of the few perceived in this context that did not end in failure or catastrophe, it is clearly an enormous success by U.N. standards. Being deemed successful in relation to events in Somalia, Angola, and the former Yugoslavia, however, can hardly be considered a compliment.

A second criteria for assessment might be whether or not the U.N. mission in Cambodia fulfilled the task assigned to it in the Paris Treaty. The signatories of the Treaty set as their stated goal: "to promote national reconciliation and to ensure the exercise of the right to self-determination of the Cambodian people through free and fair elections". Given that the factions which signed the treaty, particularly the Vietnamese-installed State of Cambodia (SoC) and the Partie of Democratic Kampuchea (the Khmer
Rouge), had been fighting for the past thirteen years and that Cambodia had little previous experience of free and fair elections, this was a tall order from the start. The Treaty called for the United Nations to control parts of the existing administrative structures of the four factions which could be used to interfere with the electoral process and destabilize the country during the transitional period before elections, including the police, military, and civil administration. The United Nations would also oversee the more general human rights situation. In addition, UNTAC was to repatriate some 350,000 refugees from the Thai-Cambodian border and independently organize and conduct “free and fair elections” in a “neutral political environment”. As Findlay points out, there was a strong Utopian element in the UNTAC mandate. One wonders whether “quixotic” is a more appropriate word.

As the mission progressed, the ideal of the Treaty contrasted repeatedly with realities on the ground. The call for the disarmament of 70 per cent of the troops of the four factions and the cantonment of the rest never took place after the Khmer Rouge refused to participate. The planned control of the “existing administrative structures”, essentially a euphemism for the State of Cambodia’s ministries (the border factions had no such organized bodies to speak of), never scratched the surface of SoC power. SoC authorities and, to a lesser extent, the Khmer Rouge made sure that the “neutral political environment” never materialized, and political and racial intimidation increased as the elections approached. If the Paris Treaty was a lance with which to attack the windmills of Cambodia’s problems, the mills continued to turn despite the United Nations’ grandiose charge.

Findlay and Chopra both raise the important questions, therefore, of what the United Nations could have done to achieve the goals of the Treaty. Both assert that two major problems were UNTAC’s slow deployment and its failure to exert even a minimum level of control over the Cambodian parties. The United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) was thrown together at the last moment as an interim U.N. presence in Cambodia before the larger U.N. mission could arrive. While this may well have seemed a good idea in New York, it created dangerous ambiguities in Cambodia. UNAMIC arrived with limited powers and poor leadership. It created the facade of a significant U.N. presence which made the absence of the full U.N. mission for the ensuing eleven months appear less pressing. The UNAMIC presence also served to undermine the legitimacy of the SoC regime at a time when there was no U.N. authority to take up the slack.

Soon after UNAMIC arrived, students and disgruntled workers began to test the waters of political actions as they condemned the rampant
corruption of officials. Anti-corruption protests broke out in Phnom Penh in December 1991, which were put down brutally when SoC soldiers opened fire on protesters in central Phnom Penh and imposed a strict curfew. Neither Findlay nor Chopra mention the important fact that as these protests were going on, students marched to the UNAMIC compound to present a petition condemning SoC abuses which the Australian soldiers refused to accept. Cambodians who had greeted the arrival of the United Nations with an almost messianic fervour got their first glimpse of the limits of United Nations authority. This theme of Cambodian hope and U.N. impotence was to continue throughout the mission.

The United Nations, it is argued in all the books except the U.N. Blue Book, could have done more to exercise its control function. The dashing French General Loridon, UNTAC's deputy military chief, had been removed from his post after recommending that the United Nations should attack the Khmer Rouge to force it to comply with the treaty it had signed. This, it seems, was an impossible option from the start. The Treaty was based on the voluntary compliance of the Cambodian parties and the establishment of a cease-fire. As Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General to Cambodia, correctly noted, using such force would have demonstrated the complete failure of a peace-keeping mission and likely cause countries providing troops to the United Nations to reconsider their commitments, positions borne out by the subsequent events in Somalia. While such dramatic use of force would probably have been counter-productive, other forms of pressure clearly could have been applied.

The United Nations, for example, lost credibility among the Cambodians when a well-publicized convoy of top U.N. officials allowed itself to be denied access to the Khmer Rouge zone by a lone teenage Khmer Rouge soldier. This took place, it should be noted, at about the same time that the world's media were focusing their attention on the brave actions of General Morillon in Srebrenica. The image of rows of shiny U.N. trucks and burly blue berets humbled by the diminutive, sandalled youth was not lost on the Cambodians. Indeed, it did not take long for most Cambodians to realize that the United Nations, with all its largesse, was, in a way, bluffing. U.N. officials made bold statements about the need to protect human rights and create a neutral political environment. It occupied the colonial buildings in Phnom Penh and the provincial capitals, and its trucks and personnel visibly dominated the streets. Yet, the quiet power remained where it had always been. U.N. investigators might swoop into a remote village to investigate a killing, but the locals knew full well that they could be punished for co-operating once the investigators left. The ineffectual, often useless, U.N. Civil Police stationed at the district level often had a poor understanding of local conditions, were poorly trained, and
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had no clear sense of what they should be doing. They could offer little protection to Cambodian villagers who might have wanted to co-operate more with the U.N. officials, or challenge the oppressive power of the local authorities.

The U.N. bluff was also called by the international media which reported an increase in political violence, particularly SoC attacks against Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) and FUNCINPEC party members in the countryside. The UNTAC Human Rights Component investigated the most serious of these incidents and, with others, urged Special Representative Akashi to take stronger action allowed under the Treaty. The Human Rights Component, for example, found conclusively that an SoC policeman had violently beaten with the butt of his pistol a man he was arresting. Witnesses were, in this case, willing to speak up and the Human Rights Component assembled a complete dossier. U.N. leaders, however, chose not to order the SoC policeman’s removal from office, as the Special Representative was empowered by the Treaty to do, but entered into consultations with the SoC regime. No action was taken against the man, and when human rights investigators later encountered him at his office, he laughed at them. A similar result emerged when the United Nations sought to have the corrupt and brutal governor of Battambang removed and then withdrew when the SoC refused to co-operate.

There were a number of reasons why UNTAC fared so poorly at controlling the SoC. Most important of these was that real control required real power which the United Nations, despite its paper mandate, was never able to exert. Even if U.N. officials had been more adept and had greater language capabilities, the significant decisions made by the local leaders were not filtering through “in” and “out” boxes at the ministries. Power was defined by relationships and underlying, invisible structures which U.N. officials probably never understood or could have understood. Additionally, both the United Nations and the SoC recognized that the former needed a success in Cambodia to retain its international credibility. With the Khmer Rouge already outside the peace process, UNTAC needed the SoC to keep the entire mission from unravelling. As Akashi acknowledged, “I cannot afford not to succeed”. The quality of the U.N. controllers was also not high, with notable exceptions, and control often meant little more than a U.N. official with a desk in a Cambodian ministry who read the occasional piece of mail and, from time to time, had tea with the minister.

While the SoC maintained its instruments of power, particularly its police and military force, it was very willing to abrogate its administrative responsibilities. SoC leaders could instill the fear of God into their components, but they were less likely to collect the garbage, feed their prisoners, or grant building permits. Workers in the ministries spent less and less
time fulfilling their duties, and often did so only when the correct monies were paid. This was one factor which contributed to the vacuum of administrative authority in Cambodia, as Findlay astutely notes. The Paris Treaty had been designed to reduce the influence and power of the SoC regime. According to the Treaty, this authority would be replaced by the Cambodian Supreme National Council (SNC), an administrative body made up of representatives of the four factions, and by the United Nations. The SNC, however, proved ineffective because of the divisions between its members, while the United Nations continually declined to step in.

When international media accounts described the high levels of intimidation and the absence of the proclaimed “neutral political environment”, pressure mounted for the United Nations to postpone the elections or take stronger measures. The former option was rejected because the alternatives to holding the elections as planned seemed worse than carrying out an even flawed election. The latter was taken up in form although not in substance. UNTAC authorized control teams to seize, unannounced, all documents in various SoC provincial offices. While damning information regarding SoC activities against opposition groups was sometimes discovered, this information led to little concrete action on the part of the United Nations.

In an even more dramatic move, Akashi authorized the establishment of a U.N. Special Prosecutor in Cambodia with the authority to issue warrants for the arrest of Cambodians accused of various crimes, particularly those with political connotations. An SoC policeman charged with murdering a FUNCINPEC member in Kampong Chhnang, and a Khmer Rouge soldier who confessed to taking part in the massacre of thirteen ethnic Vietnamese Cambodians in Kampong Chhnang, were arrested by the U.N. police and placed in special U.N. detention facilities. When the SoC Supreme Court refused to authorize the detention of these prisoners, however, the United Nations was forced to choose among several options, including releasing them and suffering another public humiliation, or trying to force the issue through the clearly sub-standard and non-independent SoC courts, or establishing U.N. courts to authorize the detention, or keeping the prisoners in extended administrative detention in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. While the last course was taken, the choice highlighted one of the central problems of the UNTAC mission — the issue of Cambodian sovereignty.

UNTAC was never intended to become a colonial power completely superseding the indigenous institutions. In fact, the treaty process was designed to end the meddling by foreign powers in Cambodian affairs which had marked the Cold War years. Cambodia’s problems, however, ran so deep that it seemed almost impossible to intervene at one level
without facing insurmountable interference at another. If a U.N. prosecutor could not operate without a legitimate, non-politicized court, should the United Nations have established its own system of prosecutors, prisons, judges, and courts, as Findlay suggests (and as the U.N. Special Prosecutor in frustration urged)? Could the United Nations appropriately have taken upon itself such neo-colonial powers in a mission designed in part to return power to the Cambodian people? On the other hand, the ideals of the treaty would not allow the United Nations to accept the low standards of the Cambodian institutions as they existed. The mission struggled to define itself in the space between these two extremes.

Despite its early rhetoric, U.N. officials themselves acknowledged as the elections neared, that a free and fair environment had not been brought about. As Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali noted in the introduction to the Blue Book, the new standard called for "the most impartial election possible under imperfect circumstances". While such a standard is certainly acceptable for an imperfect world, the fact that the United Nations was forced to come down from the ideal of its earlier statements to this understandable position denotes yet again the ambiguousness of the original mandate. The ambitious scope of the stated mandate was simply too bold for the Cambodian context. It sought to impose a new world order on a country that had yet to catch up with the old world order. It set a standard against which, despite the many successes of the mission, UNTAC's failures could be identified and condemned.

The question of why the mandate was established as it was, is another approach to evaluating the UNTAC experience. The Paris Treaty was obviously a compromise between the various Cambodian and non-Cambodian parties. Some of the compromises which determined aspects of the treaty clearly focused on the interests of the Cambodian parties themselves. Matters of representation on the SNC and questions of whether voting would be proportional versus majoritarian or based on national versus provincial constituencies fit into this category. Other compromises, however, seem more focused on the interests of the big powers than on those of the Cambodians.

As the pieces shifted on the international chess board with the break-up of the Soviet Union and the subsequent Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, it might have been possible for some of the Cambodian parties to strike deals with others which could have shifted the Cambodian political landscape. There were rumours in 1987, for example, of a possible deal between Sihanouk and Hun Sen which would have allowed Sihanouk to return and some form of power sharing agreement to emerge prior to elections. While such negotiations might have led to some type of settlement, albeit an undemocratic one, they were never seriously followed up
because the necessary big power backing was simply not there. Although Sino-Vietnamese and U.S.-Vietnamese relations were improving, neither the Chinese nor the Americans were willing to give such a moral victory to the Vietnamese and Hanoi’s ally in Phnom Penh after so many years of strife (even though such an agreement might have resulted in essentially the same ultimate outcome as the Paris Treaty). The Chinese may well have thought that alienating the Khmer Rouge would decrease the former’s credibility elsewhere in the world. The Paris formula which was eventually agreed upon was the diplomatic equivalent of a fireworks display with which the big powers symbolically exculpated themselves from the Cambodian imbroglio and removed the conflict from the international agenda. By returning responsibility for the future of Cambodia to the Cambodian officials, the big powers could wash their hands and exorcise past sins.

This confluence of interests on the part of the big powers granted a superficial credibility to peacekeeping in Cambodia. Soviet and Chinese U.N. military observers, for example, sometimes approached Cambodian authorities together to make various requests. On a deeper level, however, evaluating UNTAC requires asking whether the big powers deserved to present themselves as the saviours of Cambodia after so many years of cynically manipulating the Cambodian conflict. All of the four warring Cambodian factions, with the partial exception of the Khmer Rouge, would not have existed without the major backing of one or more foreign powers. While the Western states and the United Nations criticized the Khmer Rouge in resolutions of escalating indignation, it was difficult to forget that the Khmer Rouge were the sorcerer’s apprentice maintained, for over a decade following the Vietnamese invasion, by Chinese arms, Western food aid, and supportive votes in the United Nations. As the U.N. Blue Book demonstrates fairly, the big powers skillfully steered the Cambodian peace process through from the beginning and were able to do this precisely because of the influence they had developed through the induced reliance of the Cambodian parties. One wonders, however, whether Cambodia would be worse off had the country simply been left alone.

Another approach to evaluating the UNTAC mission is to consider its social and economic impact, a matter examined unevenly and sometimes superficially in UNRISD’s Between Hope and Insecurity. As Eva Arnvig, one of the contributors to the UNRISD book notes, U.N. personnel and money contributed significantly to the explosive growth of prostitution during the UNTAC period. Despite protests by NGO (non-governmental organization) workers in Phnom Penh, the increasing Cambodian perception of U.N. peacekeepers as exploitative whore mongers, and the fast spread of AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome), U.N. officials did little to rein in the night-time activities of UNTAC personnel.
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E.V.K. Fitzgerald, another contributor, notes that UNTAC's spending habits fuelled a speculative economy and that foreign powers acquiesced to destabilizing inflation by not appropriating significant development funds prior to the elections when Cambodian social structures were crumbling. This failure to provide development funds, of course, was exacerbated by the vociferous urging of the border factions that international aid should not be allowed to aid disproportionately the Phnom Penh regime.

Perhaps the greatest social problem in Cambodia, a problem which worsened during the UNTAC period, was that of the ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia. Of the books under review, only the U.N. Blue Book contains significant mention of this important issue. Cambodian antipathy towards the Vietnamese dates back a millenium and was clearly not a problem which the United Nations could have simply fixed. As Khmer Rouge attacks on ethnic Vietnamese communities intensified, particularly in March 1993, and the massive exodus of Vietnamese-Cambodians began, the United Nations did not do all that it might have done. As Boutros-Ghali points out in the U.N. Blue Book, the Vietnamese issue had not been considered in the Paris accords and some UNTAC leaders thought of the issue as an internal matter for the Cambodians to resolve themselves. Many of the same leaders also argued internally that publicly supporting the rights of the ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia would feed Khmer Rouge propaganda which accused UNTAC of delivering Cambodia to the Vietnamese. In fact, Special Representative Akashi even rejected suggestions that he should visit ethnic Vietnamese victims of racially motivated attacks in the Phnom Penh hospital for fear of making such an impression. While UNTAC had neither the mandate, the manpower, nor the influence to address the deep ethnic fissure in Cambodian society with regard to the ethnic Vietnamese issue, such symbolic measures might have given at least moral support to the fleeing Vietnamese. Instead, the United Nations essentially stood by as these events took place. Many of the ethnic Vietnamese who fled Cambodia, some of whom remain on the Cambodia–Vietnam border, were either born in Cambodia or had lived there for decades, and thus Cambodians by any standard of international law except, perhaps, that followed in present-day Cambodia.

Alongside these negative consequences, however, stand the very positive social effects of the UNTAC mission. The United Nations repatriated with extraordinary efficiency the entire refugee population from the Thai–Cambodian border, it allowed a free press to emerge in Cambodia for the first time in the country's history, it set standards for the treatment of prisoners, trained defence attorneys, judges, and policemen, it introduced the language of human rights, democracy, and electoral politics into Cambodian currency, it trained thousands of Cambodians in various skills,
and began a national de-mining effort. UNTAC arrived in a Cambodia which had been isolated from the outside world for seventeen years and reintroduced Cambodia and Cambodians to previously unimaginable individuals, cultures, and ideas. It returned Cambodia to the rest of the world.

But while the UNTAC presence did many things, history will ultimately judge the mission based on the political outcome of the peace process as a whole. By definition, this evaluation will shift with time, as it has done in the brief period since the May 1993 elections. In a strict technical sense, UNTAC provided the people of Cambodia with arguably the fairest election in the history of Southeast Asia. U.N. electoral workers did a spectacular job of registering voters, overseeing the vote, and counting up the ballot papers. Because the State of Cambodia authorities had not at all been neutralized during the transitional period, however, the FUNCINPEC victory ended up meaning less than it might otherwise have. FUNCINPEC inherited nominal power, which was respected by SoC authorities (albeit after a secession attempt and other post-election manoeuvres) largely because they knew that badly needed international aid would be cut off if the electoral result was not respected. FUNCINPEC, on the other hand, had little choice but to conform to SoC/CPP (Cambodian People’s Party, the SoC political party) demands because the CPP still controlled the police, military, and provincial administrations. Thus, although power has nominally changed hands, the same authorities who threatened and harassed their opponents during the electoral period continue to do so. Political intimidation and murder are still widespread, and corruption remains rampant. While Chopra claims that the U.N. mission empowered the people of Cambodia, a suggestion borne out by the massive voter turn-out and the courage of those who voted against the authorities in power, events since have suggested that intimidation and fear are more than a match for such empowerment.

Given that UNTAC, with its ambitious mandate and numerous personnel, failed to create a sense of accountability for human rights violations, it is hardly surprising that Cambodian violators still feel they can act with impunity. Human Rights Watch Asia, Amnesty International, and the U.N. Centre for Human Rights in Phnom Penh have reported continued serious abuses and murders perpetrated under the new Royal Government. In Battambang, for example, a special military unit known as S-91 was alleged by the U.N. Centre to have been responsible for at least thirty-five murders in the second half of 1993, and allegations of torture, mutilation, and cannibalism have been made against the unit. The Cambodian Government, however, has done little to address such abuses. Two journalists who had written articles critical of the government were killed in late 1994.
and, according to Amnesty International, attacks against ethnic Vietnamese inhabitants of Cambodia continue unabated.

While the September 1993 constitution has many strong points, it is unclear about the status of the ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia. This ambiguity was hardly addressed by the recent immigration law which fails to define what constitutes “Cambodian nationality” and allows for the potential expulsion of nonnationals who may have a legitimate claim of residence in or citizenship of Cambodia. In short, while the positive impact of UNTAC and the peace process can still be felt in Cambodia, UNTAC’s shadow is becoming increasingly faint as time progresses. The strength of this legacy will surely be put to the test in the potential crisis looming on the horizon, particularly at the time of the next elections and the royal succession.

With all of these faces of the peace process and the UNTAC mission pointing in so many different directions, how then is one to judge the success or failure of the process? The answer, of course, is twofold. First, just as all of the protruding faces of the Bayon are equally authentic, so too are all approaches to judging the peace process valid. Just as some of the faces at the Bayon are bigger and more prominent than others, so too are different arguments more and less relevant. Whatever the future holds for Cambodia, it is unlikely that historians will care much that UNTAC caused inflationary pressure in Cambodia, that prostitution, evil though it is, increased under UNTAC’s watch, or that the de-mining programme was begun. If Cambodia remains relatively stable and slowly develops economically and structurally, later generations will praise the United Nation’s role in Cambodia with the type of optimistic gloss that characterizes the Blue Book. If, on the other hand, the country falls apart, few will care that the refugees were returned, that there was a period when individual rights were somewhat protected, or that technically excellent elections were carried out. The Paris Treaty will be the Cambodian equivalent of Wilson’s fourteen points and the UNTAC mission, the ineffectual League of Nations. The second answer, therefore, is that the jury is still out.

Cambodia’s fate will certainly have been influenced by the events, successes, and failures described in these books. Perhaps if all goes well, those who review these books in later years will be young Cambodian scholars trained abroad through Fulbright grants and Overseas Research studentships, or at home in revitalized national universities. When they look back at these books and the U.N. mission which they describe, however, they will search in vain for Cambodian voices. The UNTAC mission sought to kick-start a democratic process in war-torn Cambodia, yet entered the country with little knowledge of local conditions. Instead of placing select
locals and expatriate Khmers in positions where they could offer their knowledge of local conditions to the United Nations. Cambodian nationals served as drivers, clerks, and translators, and expatriate Khmers as interpreters and technicians. Findlay and Chopra's useful books both do an excellent job of analysing the mission and Chopra is to be particularly commended for placing it in the global context. Neither book describes in any detail what the mission and the peace process meant to the Cambodian people, nor, for that matter, what the implications were for the Cambodian populace and political system of having a seeming neo-colonial power swoop in and out in the course of a year and a half. While the UNRISD book tries to address this imbalance by focusing on economic and social consequences of the mission within Cambodia, it is surprising that there were no Cambodian contributors to the book. Finally, because the Blue Book focuses on the international negotiations surrounding Cambodia, it excludes much of the communication between the Cambodian parties and the UNTAC leaders in Cambodia, where important base-level decisions were being made.

The UNTAC experience will certainly offer lessons, many elucidated by Findlay and Chopra, which, if learned, will make future U.N. peacekeeping missions more effective. Cambodians, however, will be little served by potential, if unlikely, U.N. successes years from now in places such as Rwanda or Liberia. If the peace process in Cambodia does unravel, however, the United Nations, for all its limitations and failings, will ultimately not be responsible. Just as the Cambodians deserve much credit for their courage during the elections, so too do they deserve final responsibility for the future of their country. The peace process and the U.N. mission have given Cambodians the opportunity to rebuild their country, to pull it out of the ruin of decades of war, mass abuse, and foreign perfidy. Imperfect though it is, this is the chance that Cambodia has, and success and failure are within the grasp of Cambodia's leaders and, insofar as they can make their voices heard, Cambodia's people. While the 416 eyes at the Bayon peer down from their various perches, they, without exception, look out at Cambodia.

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